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Despite continued efforts to improve health systems worldwide, emerging
pathogen epidemics remain a major public health concern. Effective response
to such outbreaks relies on timely intervention, ideally informed by all available
sources of data. The collection, visualization and analysis of outbreak data are
becoming increasinglycomplex,owingto thediversity in typesofdata, questions
and available methods to address them. Recent advances have led to the rise of
outbreak analytics, an emerging data science focused on the technological and
methodological aspects of theoutbreakdatapipeline, fromcollection to analysis,
modelling and reporting to inform outbreak response. In this article, we assess
the current state of the field. After laying out the context of outbreak response,
we critically review the most common analytics components, their inter-
dependencies, data requirements and the type of information they can provide
to inform operations in real time.We discuss some challenges and opportunities
and conclude on the potential role of outbreak analytics for improving our
understanding of, and response to outbreaks of emerging pathogens.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling infectious disease outbreaks
in humans, animals and plants: epidemic forecasting and control‘. This theme
issue is linked with the earlier issue ‘Modelling infectious disease outbreaks in
humans, animals and plants: approaches and important themes’.
1. Introduction
Emerging infectious diseases are a constant threat to public health worldwide.
In thepastdecade, severalmajoroutbreaks, suchas the2009 influenzapandemic [1],
& 2019 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
author and source are credited.
the Middle-East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) [2–4], the emergence of Zika [5,6] and the West African
Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak [7,8], have been potent
reminders of the need for robust surveillance systems and
timely responses to nascent epidemics [9]. The West African
EVD outbreak, by far the largest such epidemic in recorded his-
tory, in particular, had a strong impact on global health security
and public health policy and practice [7,8,10]. It highlighted the
difficulties of maintaining situational awareness in the absence
of standards for surveillance, data collection and analysis, as
well as the challenges of mounting and sustaining a large-scale
international response [7,8,11,12]. Despite the lessons learnt
[9,13,14], the recent (2018) EVDoutbreaks inDemocratic Repub-
lic of the Congo [15,16] are a stark reminder that a large number
of these challenges remain.
An important feature of the modern response to epidemics
is the increasing focus on exploiting all available data to inform
the response in real time and allow evidence-based decision
making [3,4,7,8,13,17]. Using data for improving situational
awareness is complex, involving a range of inter-connected
tasks and skills from point-of-care data collection to the gener-
ation of informative situational reports (sitreps). The science
underpinning these data pipelines involves a wide range of
approaches, including database design and mobile technology
[18,19], frequentist statistics and maximum-likelihood esti-
mation [7], interactive data visualization [20,21], geostatistics
[22–24], graph theory [20,25,26], Bayesian statistics [8,27,28],
mathematical modelling [29–31], genetic analyses [32–36]
and evidence synthesis approaches [37]. This accretion of
heterogeneous disciplines, which may be best summarized as
‘outbreak analytics’, forms an emerging domain of data
science: an ‘interdisciplinary field that uses scientific methods,
processes, algorithms and systems to extract knowledge and
insights from data in various forms’ [38], dedicated to inform-
ing outbreak response. Outbreak analytics sits at the crossroads
of public health planning, field epidemiology, methodological
development and information technologies, opening up excit-
ing opportunities for specialists in these fields towork together
to meet the needs for an epidemic response.
In this article, we outline this developing research field and
review the current state of outbreak analytics. In particular, we
focus on how different analysis components interact within
functional workflows, and how each component can be used
to inform different stages of an outbreak response. We discuss
key challenges and opportunities associated with the deploy-
ment of efficient, reliable and informative data analysis
pipelines and their potential impact.
2. The outbreak response context
(a) The different phases of an outbreak response
The focus of the public health response shifts during the
course of an epidemic or outbreak, and so do the analytics.
We identify four main stages (figure 1). The detection stage
starts with the first case and ends with the first intervention
activities (e.g. patient isolation, contact tracing, vaccination)
and involves surveillance systems and mostly qualitative
risk assessments. Next, the early response is the initial part
of the intervention during which the first simple analytics
can take place, essentially centred around estimating trans-
missibility. This blends into the intervention stage, where
more complex analytics may be involved to inform plann-
ing (e.g. vaccination strategies), which ends once the last
reported case has recovered or died. The post-intervention
stage is for lessons to be learned, for improving prepared-
ness for the next epidemic and for training and capacity
building [39].
(b) Questions during and after the intervention
During the early response, efforts are dedicated to estimating
the likely impact of the outbreak and anticipating the nature,
scale and timing of resources needed [7,13,15]. Theoretically,
different factors including not only the total number of cases
and fatalities but also themorbidity and overall impact on qual-
ity of life, as well as societal and economic impact, should
ideally be taken into account when attempting to predict
disease burden [40–43]. Generally, as the demographic and
morbidity data needed by composite measures of health-
adjusted life years [40] are lacking in outbreak response
contexts, efforts tend to focus on other proxies of impact: asses-
sing transmissibility, predicting future case incidence and
associated mortality and investigating risk factors [1,3,7,15].
Analytical needs to diversify as the intervention progresses.
While investigations of transmissibility, mortality and risk
factors remain key throughout [8], new questions may arise to
inform the implementation of control and mitigationmeasures.
Thesemay focus on predicting the impact of potential measures
including testing (e.g. ‘Could a rapid test help reduce inci-
dence?’ [29]), vaccine development (e.g. ‘Could a candidate
vaccine be evaluated in this outbreak?’ [44,45]), vaccination
campaigns (e.g. ‘Which is the optimal vaccination strategy?’
[46,47]) or travel restrictions (e.g. ‘Should international travel
be restricted?’ [48]), or on estimating the impact of current
measures such as improvements in access to care (e.g. ‘Has the
Figure 1. Successive phases of an outbreak response. The histogram along the top represents reported (yellow) and unreported (grey) incidence.
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delay between symptom onset and hospitalization been
reduced?’ [14,15]). As case incidence reduces, statistical model-
ling can also be useful for assessing or predicting the end of an
outbreak [49–51]. At the field operational level, outbreak
response analyticsmay be best focused on informing andmoni-
toring core surveillance activities and performance indicators,
such as contact tracing [11], through the use of tools for contact
data visualization [52], mapping [53,54] and on analysis pipe-
lines integrating mobile data collection tools [18,19,55,56]
with automated reporting systems [57–59]. Finally, the post-
intervention phase lends itself to retrospective studies, which
can assess further the impact of interventions [60], tease apart
finer processes driving the epidemic dynamics such as contact
patterns [12,61], study risk factors [54,62], identify avenues for
fortifying surveillance [13,36,63] and evaluate, improve and
develop modelling techniques [28,64,65].
(c) What are outbreak data?
The term ‘outbreak data’ encompasses different types of
information, of which we first distinguish ‘case data’ from ‘back-
ground data’. Case data include the description of reported cases
gathered in linelists, i.e. flat files where each row is a case and
each column a recorded variable (e.g. dates of onset and admis-
sion, gender, age, location), thereby fulfilling the definition of
‘tidy data’ in the data science community [66]. Case data also
include exposure and contact tracing data, either stored within
a linelist or in separate files, pathogenwhole genome sequencing
(WGS) anddata pertaining to outbreak investigations (e.g. case–
control and cohort study data). Background data document the
underlying characteristics of the affected populations. This
includesdemographic information (e.g.mapsofpopulationden-
sities, age stratification, mixing patterns), movement data (e.g.
borders, traveller flows, migration), health infrastructure
(e.g. healthcare facilities, drug stockpiles) and epidemiological
data themselves (e.g. levels of pre-existing immunity). A final
type of data we consider here is ‘intervention data’, which refers
to information on decisions made and efforts deployed as part
of the intervention, such as vaccination coverage, the extent of
active case finding or potential changes in the epidemiologi-
cal case definition. An in-depth discussion of data needs in
outbreaks can be found in Cori et al. [13].
3. Outbreak analytics
(a) An overview of the outbreak analytics toolbox
We use the term ‘outbreak analytics’ to refer to the variety of
tools and methods used to collect, curate, visualize, analyse,
model and report on outbreak data. These tools and their
inter-dependencies are summarized in an exemplaryworkflow
represented in figure 2, derived from analyses pipelines used
during recent epidemics of pandemic influenza [1], MERS-
CoV [4] and EVD [7,8,17]. Note that workflows may vary
substantially in other epidemic contexts. For instance, analyses
of food-borne outbreaks may focus on traceback data [67–69],
while vector-borne disease analysis may focus heavily on
modelling the vector’s ecological niche [70,71].
(b) Tools for the collection of epidemiological data
Tools for data capture have become a focus of much discussion
in recent years as those involved in outbreak response seek
to make use of important technological advances including
mobiledatacollection, cloudcomputingandbuilt-inautomated
data analyses and reporting. In resource-limited settings, inpar-
ticular, epidemiological data are still often collected with pen
and paper, the advantages of which are familiarity, simplicity,
low cost and reliability where access to Internet and power
sources may be limited. However, there are some downsides
to using paper as a data management tool, becoming increas-
ingly important with larger outbreaks, as any system for
the printing anddistribution, collection and storage anddigitiz-
ation of forms becomes overwhelmed. Additionally, two-stage
processes involving transcription of data from forms typically
introduces additional data entry errors [72–75] and substantial
delays from data capture to analysis [72].
Electronic data collection (EDC) is becoming increasingly
popular [18,19,55,56]. These tools make use of widely avail-
able, low-cost hardware (e.g. smartphones and tablets) [76]
that can, when appropriately configured, consume little
power and collect data offline, making them suitable for use
in resource-poor settings. Some of thosemay be part of existing
surveillance systems or be deployed instead for specific
enhanced surveillance and response activities during an out-
break. EDC platforms can also enhance data quality through
the use of restriction rules and logical checks, and enforce
reporting (even when there are zero cases) and entry of essen-
tial variables [72,76]. EDC can decrease the delay between data
collection, centralization and analysis, which is critical for
data-driven responses. Time can be saved through ‘form
logic’ (e.g. automatically skipping sections of a survey not
relevant to a participant), while real-time, automated centrali-
zation, data analysis and reporting can be directly built into
the platform. In addition,mobile-basedEDCenables the collec-
tion of other types of data including GPS coordinates,
photographs, barcode (useful to link case data and clinical
specimens) and even aiding diagnostics by directly interfacing
with point-of-care diagnostic devices [77–79].
Maintaining confidentiality and privacy is a legitimate con-
cern whenever data concerning human subjects are collected.
While EDC systems provide opportunities for unauthorized
interception and access to such information, many systems
support end-to-end encryption during data transfer [80],
although few provide additional security through encryption
at the level of data entry.
(c) Descriptive analyses
The first, and arguably one of the most important steps in
data analysis is exploration, where visualization plays a
central role, completed with informative summary statistics
[81,82]. The first type of graphics needed for rapid assessment
of ongoing dynamics is the epidemic curve (epicurve), which
shows case incidence time series as a histogram of new onset
dates for a given time interval [83–85]. Cumulative case
counts, sometimes used in the absence of a raw linelist, are
best avoided in epicurves, as they tend to obscure ongoing
dynamics and create statistical dependencies in data points
that will result in biases and lead to under-estimating
uncertainty in downstream modelling [86].
Maps have been at the core of infectious disease epide-
miology from a very early stage [87]. Nowadays, they are
typically used to visualize the distribution of disease [88], for
representing the ‘ecological niche’ of infectious diseases at
large scales [23,24,89] and for assessing the spatial dynamics
of an outbreak and strategizing interventions [7,8]. Providers
of free and crowd-sourced [90] geographical data like the
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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Humanitarian Open Street Maps Team (Humanitarian
OpenStreetMap Team Home; see https://www.hotosm.org/
(accessed 26 September 2018)), the Missing Maps project (Mis-
singMaps; see https://www.missingmaps.org/ (accessed 26
September 2018)), healthsites.io (see https://healthsites.io/
(accessed 26 September 2018)) and the Radiant Earth Foun-
dation (Radiant Earth Foundation – Earth imagery for
impact; seehttps://www.radiant.earth (accessed18November
2018)) provide layers of spatial data that include information on
the location of households and health facilities, among other
determinants. Several tools including SaTScan and ClusterSeer
are routinely applied to surveillance systemdata for automated
outbreak detection and the evaluation of clustering of disease
by time and space [91]. Other examples of freely availablemap-
ping tools that can help track the spread of infectious diseases
include the Spatial Epidemiology of Viral Haemorrhagic
Fevers (VHF) disease visualization (see http://www.health-
data.org/datavisualization/spatial-epidemiology-viralhemor-
rhagic-fevers; accessed19September 2018),whichmaps risksof
emergence and spread of VHF diseases, Nextstrain [92] and
Microreact [93], which focus on mapping pathogen evolution
and epidemic spread, and HealthMap [94], which provides
resources for the rapid detection of outbreaks. Geographical
locations of reported cases can also be useful for informing
more complex modelling approaches [95].
Figure 2. Example of outbreak analytics workflow. This schematic represents eight general analyses that can be performed from outbreak data. Outputs containing
actionable information for the operations are represented as hexagons. Data needed for each analysis are represented as a different colour in the center, using plain
and light shading for mandatory and optional data, respectively. (Online version in colour.)
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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In epidemics driven by person-to-person transmission, a
last essential source of data is contact data [20], which includes
data on case exposure [12] as well as contact tracing, where
appropriate [11,63]. Exposure data document transmission
pairs, which can yield precious insights into ‘paired delays’
(figure 2) including the serial interval (time between onsets
of a case and their infector) or the generation time (time
between the dates of infections of a case and their infector)
[7,8], which are in turn useful for estimating transmissibility
[27,28,96,97]. Exposure data can also be used to investigate
the occurrence and determinants of super-spreading events
[12] and help identify introduction events in the case of zoono-
tic diseases [98]. Contact tracing, through the early detection of
new cases and their subsequent isolation and treatment, plays a
central role in reducing onward transmission and therefore
containing outbreaks [11,63,99], while additionally providing
potential information on risk factors [7,11].
Summary statistics are a useful complement to data visual-
ization in the exploratory phase of data analysis. Some metrics,
such as transmissibility, require the use of statistical or math-
ematical models in order to be estimated (see §3d below) and
are therefore not readily available as descriptive tools. Other
useful statistics can be readily computed from linelists, includ-
ing different demographic indicators of the reported cases
(e.g. gender, age, occupation [7,100,101]), case fatality ratios
(the proportion of cases who died of the infection) or case
delays such as the times to hospitalization, recovery or death,
reported as a whole [1,7,8] or stratified by groups [100,101].
The incubation period (time from infection to symptom onset)
is another important delay for informing the intervention (e.g.
to define the duration of contact tracing or declare the end of
an outbreak), but can be harder to derive as it requires data on
case exposure as well. Note that in the case of delays, these are
best analysed by characterising the full distribution (e.g. by fit-
ting to an appropriate probability distribution such as
discretized Gamma [7]) rather than reported as a single central
value [7,8,102,103].
(d) Quantifying transmissibility
The ‘transmissibility’ of a disease is here used to refer to the
rate at which new cases arise in the population, resulting
either in epidemic growth or decline [1,3,27,28]. Rather than
an intrinsic property of a specific disease, transmissibility
thus defined quantifies the propagation of a pathogen in a
given epidemic setting and is impacted by multiple factors
including population demographics, mixing and levels pre-
existing immunity. Importantly, estimates of transmissibility
reported in the literature will typically be biased towards
higher values, as subcritical outbreaks are by definition less
likely to be detected. Several metrics of transmissibility can
be used depending on the type of data available and can be
estimated using different approaches.
A first measure of transmissibility is the growth rate (r),
which is estimated from a simple model where case incidence
is either exponentially growing (r. 0) or declining (r, 0).
Typically, r is estimated directly from epicurves (figure 2)
using a log-linear model, where r is defined as the slope of a
linear regression on log-transformed incidence [104,105].
Besides its simplicity and its computational efficiency, this
approach has the benefits of being embedded in the linear
modelling framework, thereby allowing one to measure the
uncertainty associated with a given estimate of r, to test for
differences in growth rates, e.g. between different locations,
and to derive short-term incidence predictions. Moreover, the
growth rate can also be used to estimate the doubling and halv-
ing times of the epidemic, i.e. the time during which incidence
doubles (respectively is halved), as alternative metrics of trans-
missibility [103]. Unfortunately, the log-linear model can only
fit exponentially growing or decaying outbreaks, which may
not always be appropriate in the presence of complex spatial
or age structure, or owing to changes in reporting, transmissi-
bility or proportion of susceptible individuals over time.
Besides, it cannot readily accommodate time periods with no
cases, so that its applicability may in practice be restricted.
While rquantifies the speedatwhichadisease spreads, itdoes
not contain information on the level of the intervention that is
necessary to control a disease [106]. This is better characterized
by the reproduction number (here generically noted ‘R’), which
measures the average number of secondary cases caused by
each primary case. Researchers typically distinguish the basic
reproduction number (R0 [104]), which applies in a large, fully
susceptible population, without any control measures, from
the effective reproduction number (Reff ), which is the number
of secondary cases after accounting for behavioural changes,
interventions and declines in susceptibility [96]. The current
reproduction number determines the dynamics of the epidemic
in the near future, with values greater than 1 predicting an
increase in cases, and values less than 1 predicting control
[104]. The value of R can also be used to calculate the fraction
of the population that needs to be immunized (typically through
vaccination) in order to contain an outbreak [104].
Different methodological approaches have been developed
to estimate the reproduction number. R can be approximated
using estimates of the growth rate r combined with knowledge
of the generation time distribution [97]. R can also be derived
from compartmental models [104,107]. The formula will
depend on the type of model used, but such estimation
will usually require that different rates (e.g. rates of infection,
recovery, death) are either known or estimated by fitting the
model to data [104,107]. Real-world complexities can be incor-
porated into this approach; however, fitting suchmodels can be
challenging and may require computationally intensive algor-
ithms such as data augmentation, approximate bayesian
computation, or particle filters [108]. Compartmental models
also require assumptions about the total population size and
the proportion of the population at risk, which may be difficult
to estimate in an outbreak. As an alternative, branching process
models can be used to estimate R directly from incidence data
[27,28,96,109]. This requires a pre-specified distribution of the
generation time, or of the serial interval, although recent devel-
opments suggest that in some cases, the generation time
distribution itself can also be simultaneously estimated [4].
Branching process models are usually much simpler to fit to
data than their compartmental counterparts, which facilitates
their use in real time [27].
Beyond the mere estimation of transmissibility, it is often
essential to forecast future incidence for advocacy and plan-
ning purposes, e.g. to compare different interventions and
epidemic scenarios [7,8,15,30]. A variety of mathematical and
statistical models, including those reviewed here for estimating
transmissibility, can also be used for short-term incidence fore-
casting [65]. Despite the growing body of research focusing on
predicting incidence during epidemics [65,110], there are cur-
rently no gold standards and the relative performances of
forecasting methods largely remain to be assessed. Methods
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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that have been developed and applied in other fields to rigor-
ously assess not just the accuracy of forecasts but also how
well models quantify the inherent uncertainty in making
predictions, are only rarely applied in infectious disease epide-
miology [111,112]. Whether it is to estimate R or predict future
incidence, themost appropriatemethod ultimately depends on
the particular epidemiological setting, existing knowledge of
the transmission dynamics and data availability. Branching
process models, for example, can be used for a quick estimate
of the current value of R from the recent trend in case numbers
and, by extrapolating this forward, of expected case numbers in
the near future [27,28,96]. Mechanistic or simulation models,
on the other hand, aim to include amore explicit representation
of the different factors that might influence transmission. They
can be a more natural choice for assessing the expected impact
of possible interventions, but they usually require careful para-
metrization and often intensive computation [29,30,45,113],
both of which can be challenging early in an outbreak when
data are scarce and rapid turnaround crucial.
(e) Analytical epidemiological techniques
Analytical epidemiological studies use data to better describe
outbreaks and populations at risk and inform real-time and
subsequent response efforts. Typically, these are conducted
during the intervention and post-intervention phases of an out-
break response (figure 1). They include observational designs
such as retrospective cohort and case–control studies to ident-
ify risk factors and quantify associations between potential
causes and their outcomes (typically, the disease in question),
and experimental designs, such as randomized-control studies
used to estimate the impact of interventions such as vaccination
and treatments [114]. These studies reside outside of the
normal scope of outbreak response activities, being inserted
ad hoc as functions that are not necessarily routine response
activities such as strengthening surveillance. In the case of
observational epidemiological studies, data on exposures and
outcomes are required, permitting estimations of the increased
risk of disease among people exposed to risk factors of interest
[54,62,115,116]. In the case of experimental epidemiology, data
on outcomes of interest are collected to permit estimations of
heterogeneity among groups (e.g. in the presence/absence of
intervention).
The usefulness of such studies in informing outbreak
response is highly context-dependent. Observational studies
may be undertaken early on in the intervention phase to
help identify ongoing infection sources of environmental,
food-borne or water-borne nature [117] and to stop the out-
break at its source. In longer-running outbreaks, they can
provide insights into opportunities for control [53,115,118]
and inform global policy decisions that relate to outbreak
response [119]. However, the time and expertise needed to
prepare and implement these studies may preclude their
application in the midst of an ongoing outbreak, so that the
cost and benefits of such an undertaking need to be carefully
weighed in emergency settings.
( f ) Genetic analyses
Whole genome sequencing of pathogens is increasingly afford-
able and reliable, and therefore more frequent in outbreak
investigations [1,120–126]. As technology is making real-time
sequencing in the field a developing standard in the coming
years [127,128], genetic analysis will likely carve out its own
space in the outbreak analytics toolkit.
Different methods can be used to extract information from
pathogen WGS. In bacterial genomics, molecular epidemiol-
ogy methods have been used extensively for defining strains
of related isolates [32,129], which can be used to infer various
features of the pathogens sampled such as their origins, antimi-
crobial resistance profiles, virulence or antigenic characteristics
[130–132]. These methods usually exploit only a fraction of the
information containedwithin pathogens’ genomes, as they rely
on genetic variation in a limited number of housekeeping
genes [32,129]. While these methods will likely remain useful
in years to come, substantially more information can be
extracted by using WGS to reconstruct phylogenetic trees,
which represent the evolutionary history of the sampled iso-
lates, assuming the absence of selection or horizontal gene
transfers [133]. Different types of phylogenetic reconstruction
methods can be used, including fast, scalable distance-based
methods [134] or more computer-intensive approaches using
a maximum-likelihood [135,136] or the Bayesian framework
[33,137]. Phylogenies can be used to assess the origins of a
set of pathogens [138], patterns of geographical spread [125],
host species jumps [139,140], past fluctuations in the pathogen
population sizes [141] and even, in some cases, the reproduc-
tion number [1]. Importantly, there is a growing tendency to
analyse phylogenetic trees in the broader context of other epi-
demiological data (mainly geographical locations until now),
which is facilitated by user-friendly Web applications [92,93].
A further step towards integrating WGS alongside epide-
miological data is the reconstruction of transmission trees
(who infects whom) using evidence synthesis approaches.
This methodological field has been growing fast over the past
decade [25,142–148], but most applications of these methods
remain within academia and their usefulness in the field in
an outbreak response context needs to be critically assessed.
A potential benefit of accurately reconstructing transmission
trees lies in the identification of multiple introductions, the
quantification of the proportion of unreported cases and the
detection of heterogeneities in individual transmissibility
[145]. Unfortunately, the reconstruction of transmission trees
is a difficult and computationally intensive problem. First,
most diseases do not accumulate sufficient genetic diversity
during the course of an outbreak to allow the accurate recon-
struction of transmission chains, so that multiple data sources
need to be used [35], making these methods more data-
demanding than most other approaches in outbreak analytics
(figure 2). In addition, the complex nature of the problem
requires the use of Bayesian methods for model fitting,
making these approaches difficult to interpret by non-experts
[145,146,148].
4. Discussion
In this article, we reviewed methodological and technological
resources forming the basis of outbreak analytics, an emerg-
ing data science for informing outbreak response. Outbreak
analytics is embedded within a broader public health infor-
mation context that starts with disease surveillance systems,
followed by risk assessment andmanagement, the epidemiolo-
gical response itself, and finishes with the production of
actionable information for decision making. Part of the chal-
lenge that this new field will face in the coming years
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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pertains to the seamless integration of data analytics pipelines
within existing workflows. As responders can allocate only
limited time to data analysis, analytics resources should
produce simple, interpretable results, highlighting the most
pressing issues that need addressing and monitoring all
relevant indicators to inform the response.
Outbreak analytics and resulting outputs are central to the
surveillance pillar of any outbreak response, yet resources and
capacities to ensure data availability and quality are often lim-
ited owing to operational constraints [16]. Priorities in terms of
data needs should be defined bywhat actionable information it
may give access to through the available analytics pipelines
[13]. In this respect, we foresee that typical linelist data such
as dates of events (e.g. onset, reporting, hospitalization, dis-
charge), age, gender, disease outcome, geographical locations
and exposure data will fulfil most needs, while other data
such as WGS may only be useful for specific diseases and con-
texts [34,35]. Intervention data are rarely collected but should
be given more consideration, as they are key to assessing the
impact and effectiveness of control measures, both during
and after the operations. Similarly, data on the fraction of
cases reported (and its variations through time), as well as be-
havioural changes (e.g. care-seeking behaviour) in the affected
populations, can be very important sources of information for
modelling [149].
Fortunately, what we called ‘background data’ in this
article can be gathered and shared outside of the epidemic con-
text. Besides maps, population census, sero-surveys or genetic
databanks, data on the natural histories of diseases derived
from past epidemics, such as key delay distributions and trans-
missibility, can form a useful substitute to real-time estimates,
especially in the early stages of outbreaks when such data may
be lacking. While crowd-sourced initiatives are promising and
have been used successfully in low resource settings [90], more
efforts are needed to collate and curate open data sources,
assess their quality and make them widely available to the
community.We argue that international public health agencies
and non-governmental agencies should play a central role in
orchestrating such background data preparedness.
Outbreak analytics is a developing field, and as such, there
remain many gaps in terms of data collection, analysis and
reporting tools. Some methodological challenges persist, such
as better characterising forecasting methods [28,64,65], includ-
ing spatial information and population flows into existing
transmission models [95], and improving the integration of
different types of data for reconstructing transmission trees
[35]. In order to ensure transparent methods and availability
to analysts in any setting, the implementation must be as
freely available, open-source software. Among other popular
programming languages, such as Python, Java, or Julia, the R
software [150] arguably offers the largest collection of free
tools for data analysis and reporting, and an increasing
number of packages for infectious disease epidemiology
[20,21,27,84,145] may form a solid starting point for the devel-
opment of a comprehensive, robust and transparent toolkit for
the analysis of epidemic data [151]. Importantly, the use of a
common platform for the development and use of outbreak
analytics tools will also likely contribute to standardizing
data practices, including collection, sharing and analysis.
A final point relates to the use and dissemination of these
new resources: how can outbreak analytics best help improve
public health? As noted by Bausch & Clougherty [39], health
science should not be an entity unto itself, but a means to an end.
Insofar as it can help field epidemiologists collect, visualize
and analyse data, and subsequently provide decision-makers
with actionable information, outbreak analytics will likely
occupy an increasing space in field epidemiology over the
years to come. We foresee that the dissemination of free train-
ing resources [152], the modernization of field epidemiology
training programmes and the deployment of applied data
scientists to the field with a sustained capacity building in
resource-poor and vulnerable countries will be instrumental
in shaping the future of this emerging field of health science.
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